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PATRICK TOMLIN 
On Limited Aggregation* 
Forthcoming in Philosophy & Public Affairs 
 
I Introduction: Limited Aggregation and the Relevance View 
Consider the following pair of cases: 
 
Case 1. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of 
people, N1, from paralysis. 
 
Case 2. You can save one person from death, or some larger number of 
people, N2, from a mild headache. 
 
On one view, let’s call it Pure Aggregation, in both cases we have to see how 
large N is before deciding what to do. If N1 gets large enough, we should save 
the people from paralysis. And if N2 gets large enough, we should prevent the 
mild headaches. According to another view, Anti-Aggregation, in both cases we 
should save the one person from death: we should simply satisfy the strongest 
claim, no matter how large the number of people possessing competing weaker 
claims gets. 
 
Many people believe that we should take prima facie inconsistent stances on 
these two cases.1 That is, we should accept aggregation of the lesser claims in 
Case 1, but not in Case 2: there is some number of people we should save from 
                                                      
* I am grateful to Aart van Gils for sparking my interest in this topic. The paper was presented 
and discussed at Oxford, York, and Goethe Universität’s Forschungskolleg 
Humanwissenschaften. For further help in improving the paper, I am grateful to Aart van Gils, 
John Halstead, Robert Jubb, Thomas Sinclair, Zofia Stemplowska, Alex Voorhoeve, and the 
editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. I am especially grateful to Christian Barry, Brad Hooker, 
Jeff McMahan, Kieran Oberman, and Victor Tadros for detailed discussion and advice. Whilst 
writing the paper, I was supported by the University of Reading 2020 Fellowship, and Goethe 
Universität’s Justitia Amplificata centre and Forschungskolleg. 
1 For relevant survey data, see Alex Voorhoeve, ‘Balancing Small against Large Burdens’ in 
Behavioural Public Policy (forthcoming); and ‘Healthy Nails versus Long Lives: An Analysis of a 
Dutch Priority-Setting Proposal’ (unpublished m/s, available at: 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/voorhoev/Healthy%20Nails%20versus%20Long%20Lives.pdf) 
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paralysis over saving a single person from death, but there is no number of mild 
headaches which could outweigh, in the relevant sense, the importance of 
saving someone’s life. These people favour Limited Aggregation. 
 
The challenge for the Limited Aggregation view is to explain why aggregation is 
acceptable in Case 1 but not in Case 2. The most influential answer to this 
challenge is to posit a distinction between the way the two sets of claims relate 
to one another in the two cases: in Case 1, the claim against death and the 
claims against paralysis are sufficiently close in strength to be, in T.M. Scanlon’s 
words, ‘relevant’ to one another; whilst in Case 2, the claims against mild 
headaches possessed by the many are not close enough in strength to the claim 
against death for them to be considered ‘relevant’. Aggregation is then limited 
to weaker claims that are ‘relevant’. 
 
This kind of approach has been advocated by some of the most influential 
moral and political philosophers of the last thirty years. For example, in an oft-
cited passage, Scanlon argues:  
If one harm, though not as serious as another, is nonetheless serious 
enough to be morally ‘relevant’ to it, then it is appropriate, in deciding 
whether to prevent more serious harms at the cost of not being able to 
prevent a greater number of less serious ones, to take into account the 
number of harms involved on each side. But if one harm is not only less 
serious than, but not even ‘relevant to,’ some greater one, then we do 
not need to take the number of people who would suffer these two 
harms into account in deciding which to prevent, but should always 
prevent the more serious harm.2  
 
                                                      
2 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 
pp. 239-240. See also: T.M. Scanlon, ‘Replies’ in Ratio 16 (2003): 424-439. It is a challenge for 
Scanlon to incorporate this position within his contractualist framework. I will not take up that 
issue here. 
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F.M. Kamm defends a similar view. According to Kamm’s Principle of Irrelevant 
Utilities, some gains or losses are too small to be included in a decision when 
much more is at stake for others.3 Michael Otsuka agrees, appealing to Kamm’s 
principle to explain why we should not aggregate the complaints of many 
people subjected to a low risk of death, when compared with a certainty of 
serious harm for one person.4 
 
Alex Voorhoeve has recently defended a variant of this view. Voorhoeve calls 
his account Aggregate Relevant Claims (ARC). Voorhoeve gives a very clear 
account of how ARC will work, at least in a limited set of cases:5 
ARC: 
1. Each individual whose well-being is at stake has a claim on you to be 
helped. (An individual for whom nothing is at stake does not have a 
claim). 
2. Individuals’ claims compete just in case they cannot be jointly satisfied. 
3. An individual’s claim is stronger: 
a. the more her well-being would be increased by being aided; and 
b. the lower the level of well-being from which this increase would 
take place 
4. A claim is relevant if and only if it is sufficiently strong relative to the 
strongest competing claim. 
5. You should choose an alternative that satisfies the greatest sum of 
strength-weighted, relevant claims. 
 
                                                      
3 F.M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality Volume 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chs. 8-10; 
and Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 297-298, 484-486. For 
discussion, see Iwao Hirose, Moral Aggregation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch. 8. 
4 Michael Otsuka, ‘Risking Life and Limb: how to discount harms by their probability’ in I. 
Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels and Nir Eyal, Identified versus Statistical Lives: An 
Interdisciplinary Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 79-80. Elsewhere, 
Otsuka has argued for the need for a theory that treads the line between Anti-Aggregation and 
Pure Aggregation. See his ‘Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals’ in 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 34 (2006): 109-135. 
5 Alex Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims?’ in Ethics 125: 64-87, at pp. 
66-67. 
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Larry Temkin claims that trade-offs between stronger and weaker claims are 
sometimes desirable, but that ‘virtually all agree that, other things equal, it 
would be worse if fifty people suffered from AIDS, quadriplegia, severe 
psychosis, or being deaf, dumb, and blind, than if virtually any number of 
people suffered from a minor nosebleed, a slight cold, a sprained finger, or a 
short mild headache.’6 Temkin argues, with Kamm, Scanlon, and Voorhoeve, 
that these judgments are best explained by the relationship between the two 
sets of claims, namely their relative strength.7 Temkin finds such a view 
‘compellingly plausible.’8 Temkin’s view, however, differs in an important way 
from Scanlon’s, Kamm’s, and Voorhoeve’s. Temkin’s view concerns the 
evaluative question of which outcomes are better or worse, whilst those of 
Scanlon, Kamm, and Voorhoeve concern the normative question of whom we 
ought to save. In what follows, I will primarily focus on the normative version 
of this approach, but what I say applies, mutatis mutandis, to the evaluative 
version as well. 
 
While many proponents of Limited Aggregation are non-consequentialists and 
many proponents of Pure Aggregation are consequentialists, the two sets of 
positions do not map on to one another as neatly as one might suppose. First, 
we might hold a Limited Aggregation view about goodness, like Temkin’s, but 
nevertheless be consequentialists in believing that we are required to maximize 
the good. Second, we might favour Pure Aggregation about whom to save, but 
employ all sorts of other paradigmatically non-consequentialist distinctions, 
views, and principles, such as the doing/allowing distinction, the asymmetry 
between harm and benefit, the means principle, the moral relevance of 
intentions, fundamental rights, and the personal prerogative. For example, it 
doesn’t follow from saying that we ought to save the many in Case 2 that we 
                                                      
6 Larry S. Temkin, Rethinking the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 33. 
Emphasis in original. 
7 Ibid., p. 32. 
8 Ibid., p. 37. 
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can permissibly kill the one to achieve the same end, or that the one must kill 
herself, or allow herself to die, to achieve the same end. 
 
Let us call this version of the Limited Aggregation position concerning the 
‘relevance’ between claims the Relevance View. The Relevance View certainly 
delivers judgments in line with common intuitions about Cases 1 and 2, and is 
attractive for that reason. But Cases 1 and 2 both have three key features which 
cases used in discussions of these issues often share. First, there are only two 
groups of potential beneficiaries. Second, the groups are homogenous. That is, 
within each group, everyone has precisely the same claim. Third, the groups are 
in competition – you can only save all of one group, or all of another. Although 
the cases used to motivate the intuitions behind the Relevance View share 
these stylised features, the position is, of course, supposed to have application 
beyond these specific examples.9 In particular, proponents have argued that 
healthcare decisions ought to be made in accordance with, and healthcare 
systems organised along the lines suggested by, the Relevance View.10 
 
Some well-known criticisms of the Relevance View focus on the first key 
feature, and present cases in which more than two homogenous groups are in 
                                                      
9 It is worth noting that in ‘How Should we Aggregate Competing Claims?’ Voorhoeve explicitly 
limits his discussion, for simplicity, to cases in which ‘claims to an alternative are either all 
irrelevant or relevant’ (p. 67) (i.e., roughly-speaking, homogenous group cases). However, 
Voorhoeve doesn’t say that ARC doesn’t apply beyond such cases, and he doesn’t articulate an 
independent view for ‘diverse group’ cases, nor a rationale for why they should be treated 
differently. Kamm is clear that her Principle of Irrelevant Utilities does apply to ‘diverse group’ 
cases, and key intuitions in support of the principle are derived from such cases (such as one in 
which one claim against death is pitted against one claim against death plus one claim against a 
sore throat. See: Morality, Mortality Volume 1, p. 146.) If the Relevance View were restricted to 
homogenous group cases, it would not apply to, or draw support from, Kamm’s tie-break cases. 
It would also lack the real-world relevance its adherents claim for it. Furthermore, such a 
restriction would seem ad hoc, and none of the arguments given for the Relevance View seem 
to support restricting it in this way. At the very least, I take it that adherents of the Relevance 
View think that the notion of ‘relevance’ should apply beyond homogenous group cases, and so 
my criticisms about the ambiguity of relevance, and how various anchoring rules would classify 
claims as relevant or irrelevant, would apply to any such view. 
10 See, for example, the exchange between Voorhoeve and Kamm in Journal of Medical Ethics 41 
(2015): 492-495; Temkin’s discussion of WHO decisions in Rethinking the Good, pp. 79-80; 
Voorhoeve, ‘Healthy Nails versus Long Lives’; Voorhoeve, ‘Balancing Small against Large 
Burdens’. 
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competition. Once we move from two- to three-group cases, the Relevance 
View seems to breach two plausible axioms of rationality: transitivity, and the 
Principle of Irrelevant Alternatives.11 These criticisms are well-known, and the 
advocates of the Relevance View have discussed and replied to them, 
convincingly in my view.12 
 
In this paper I seek to advance some new and, I think, more damning criticisms 
of the view, both in terms of its theoretical plausibility and in terms of its 
practical relevance when it comes to making decisions about healthcare 
resources. Instead of focussing on cases with more than two groups, I focus on 
cases which do not share the second and third common features: homogenous 
groups, and competition between groups. Once we look at these cases, some 
serious, hitherto unexplored, problems with the Relevance View come to light. 
These problems concern the Relevance View’s plausibility in cases with 
internally diverse competing groups, and its scope. 
 
                                                      
11 In assessing the accusation of intransitivity, it is important to keep the two versions of the 
Relevance View separate. In order to endorse the evaluative version, we must deny that ‘all 
things considered better than’ is transitive. This is a significant bullet to bite, though some are 
prepared to bite it, or at least consider it (Temkin, Rethinking the Good). But the accusation 
that ‘ought to be chosen over’ is not transitive across different pairwise comparisons is much 
less troubling: ‘ought to be chosen over’ is not even the sort of thing we would expect to be 
transitive, and therefore much less is at stake in rejecting transitivity in this context. Indeed, 
even utilitarians should reject transitivity here. Imagine I must choose whom to give some good 
to, candidate A, B, or C. Considering only the happiness of non-candidates, we would rank 
them as follows: A>B>C. But it will make C very very unhappy to lose out to A in particular, so 
much so that this outweighs the non-candidates’ preference for A over C. Therefore, in pairwise 
competitions, according to utilitarianism, I should choose C over A, A over B, and B over C. The 
utilitarian may deny that ‘Choosing A and so upsetting C’ is the same option as ‘Choosing A 
over B’. But this is to invoke a moralized way of individuating options, and the proponent of the 
Relevance View can do the same, thereby preserving transitivity. For example, this is 
Voorhoeve’s response (‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims’, pp. 78-79). The 
disagreement therefore comes down to what is morally relevant, not whether one theory 
violates transitivity whilst another does not. On transitivity and deontic concepts more 
generally, see: Temkin, Rethinking the Good, pp. 195-201; F.M. Kamm, ‘Supererogation and 
Obligation’ in Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 118-138. 
12 Variants of these criticisms can be found in: Derek Parfit, ‘Justifiability to Each Person’ in 
Ratio 16 (2003): 368-390, at p. 384; Alistair Norcross, ‘Contractualism and Aggregation’ in Social 
Theory and Practice 28 (2002): 303-314, at pp. 306-309; John Halstead, ‘The Numbers Always 
Count’ in Ethics 126 (2016): 789-802, at pp. 797-799. For responses, see: Kamm, Intricate Ethics, 
pp. 298 and 484-487; Voorhoeve, ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims’, pp. 76-79, 
and ‘Why One should Count only Claims with which One Can Sympathize’ in Public Health 
Ethics 10:2 (2017): 148-56 ; Temkin, Rethinking the Good. 
 7 
 
Consideration of cases involving groups of claims of diverse strength reveals 
two problems. First, there is a key ambiguity in the position. I call this the 
‘anchoring problem’. Second, any way of resolving the problem entails deeply 
counter-intuitive judgments that violate core normative principles. The critique 
of the Relevance View’s scope shows that it simply does not apply to many 
decisions about healthcare resource allocation. Furthermore, there is no simple 
or obvious way to extend or amend the Relevance View so that it will apply to 
healthcare choices, since obvious extensions have counter-intuitive results, or 
pose more questions than they answer. I conclude by discussing what other 
options we have, if we reject the Relevance View. 
 
II The anchoring problem 
Cases 1 and 2 involve homogenous groups. That is, we can help either some 
number of people with condition x, or some number of people with condition 
y. Within each group, each person is identical in the relevant respects: they will 
be equally badly off if left alone, and equally well off if assisted, and so their 
claims are of identical strength. But the Relevance View is surely supposed to 
apply beyond these cases: if it applied only to cases involving homogenous 
groups, it would have no relevance outside philosophical examples. In the real 
world, even when we save many people with the same condition their 
experiences of that condition will vary, often markedly, such that they will have 
claims of different strengths.  
 
The focus on homogenous group cases is, of course, the kind of simplifying 
move that philosophers often make, in order to help us get clear on the issues. 
However, concentrating on homogenous group cases hides an important 
ambiguity in the Relevance View.13 We can call this the ‘anchoring problem’. 
Once the ambiguity is revealed, there are two obvious interpretations. But 
                                                      
13 Both Derek Parfit and Frances Kamm discuss cases in which the groups are not homogenous, 
but both use cases in which the strongest claim competes against a group of diverse claims. 
Therefore, these cases neither show up the ambiguity I explore here, nor produce the counter-
intuitive results I later show. See: Parfit, ‘Justifiability’, p. 383 n.16; F.M. Kamm, Morality, 
Mortality Volume I, chs. 8-10. 
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neither is attractive in diverse group cases. Nor are more complex anchoring 
principles. 
 
In order for the Relevance View to get off the ground, it needs to distinguish 
between those claims that are relevant within a choice situation and those that 
are not. In order for a claim to be relevant, it needs to be sufficiently strong in 
comparison with some other claim. Let us call this latter claim the ‘anchoring 
claim’. In Cases 1 and 2, it is obvious what the anchoring claim is – it is the 
claim against death. All other claims must be measured against this claim to 
see if they are relevant. This is also true of all of the examples in the literature 
which I have come across: there is always some claim – the strongest claim 
under consideration – which is clearly the anchoring claim. Voorhoeve captures 
this idea with his fourth principle: 
 
4. A claim is relevant if and only if it is sufficiently strong relative to the 
strongest competing claim. 
 
However, this principle is open to two interpretations. We could either Anchor 
by Strength, or Anchor by Competition: 
 
Anchor by Strength: in order to be relevant, a claim must be sufficiently 
strong relative to the strongest overall claim in the competition. 
 
Anchor by Competition: in order to be relevant, a claim must be 
sufficiently strong relative to the strongest claim with which it competes. 
 
In order to see how these two interpretations come apart, consider Case 3 
below. In this case, and in all cases that follow, the following relevance relations 
hold: 
 
Severe impairment is relevant to death. Saving ten people from severe 
impairment outweighs saving one person from death. 
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Mild impairment is relevant to severe impairment. Saving ten people 
from mild impairment outweighs saving one person from severe 
impairment. 
Mild impairment is not relevant to death.14 
 
Case 3. You can save Group A or Group B. Group A consists of some 
people who are facing death and some who are facing mild impairment. 
Group B consists of some people who are facing severe impairment.  
 
We need to decide whether those in Group A who face mild impairment have 
relevant claims. According to Anchor by Strength they do not: their claim is not 
relevant to the strongest claims in the competition (the claims against death, 
held by other members of Group A). In contrast, according to Anchor by 
Competition, those facing mild impairment do have a relevant claim, since the 
strongest claims with which they compete are the claims against severe 
impairment. 
 
This is the ‘anchoring problem’. We do not see this problem in homogenous 
group cases, since in such cases all claims either (a) are the strongest claim in 
the competition, or (b) compete with the strongest claim in the competition, 
and so the question of whether we Anchor by Strength or Anchor by 
Competition is never raised, let alone explicitly answered. The focus on 
homogenous group cases has hidden the distinction between the two 
interpretations, and so nobody has thus far articulated the distinction or 
defended one interpretation over the other (even if those advancing the 
Relevance View may have had one in mind). 
 
III Assessing Anchor by Competition 
                                                      
14 I have chosen the generic terms ‘severe impairment’ and ‘mild impairment’ in order to 
bracket disagreement over exactly what is ‘relevant to’ what, since my claims in this paper do 
not depend upon any particular view about which conditions are relevant to which.   
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I now want to show how diverse group cases show both interpretations of the  
anchoring rule have seriously counter-intuitive implications. I shall also 
highlight how the respect-based reply that some proponents of the Relevance 
View have given to other supposed counter-examples does not apply to my 
cases.  
 
Let’s examine Anchor by Competition first. Consider this case:  
 
Case 4.  
Stage 1: you can save Group A or Group B. Group A consists of one dying 
person. Group B consists of 10 people facing severe impairment. The 
Relevance View requires you to save Group B. 
 
Stage 2: 10 people facing mild impairment are added to both Groups. 
 
Since we had a clear conclusion at Stage 1, and then added equal claims to both 
sides, we might expect everything to remain the same. Either the claims of 
those facing mild impairment are relevant, in which case the two sets of claims 
counter-balance one another, or they are not relevant, in which case they 
would have no bearing on our choice. 
 
However, according to Anchor by Competition, the claims of those facing mild 
impairment who were added to Group A are relevant (since they compete with 
those in Group B facing severe impairment), whilst the claims of those added to 
Group B are not relevant (since they compete with the person in Group A 
facing death). This is despite the fact that all these people have the exact same 
claim. This seems to violate a key principle that proponents of the Relevance 
View would most likely accept, a principle we can call Equal Consideration for 
Equal Claims. 
  
Equal Consideration for Equal Claims: all claims of equal strength ought 
to be given equal weight in determining which group to save. 
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To be clear, any plausible view concerning whom we should save between 
competing groups will allow that people holding equal claims may be treated 
differentially. Unless you are prepared to save nobody, in any case with equal 
claims on both sides you will save some but not others with the same strength 
of claim. But Anchor by Competition introduces a different form of inequality 
between equal claims, since it treats equally strong claims differently not only 
in terms of outcomes, but also in terms of how they affect the decision, since it 
recommends considering some claims against mild impairment as relevant to 
the decision, but not others. In rejecting a principle which does not require us 
to save the largest of two groups of people facing death, Scanlon objects that 
such a principle does ‘not require agents to treat the claims of each person who 
could be saved as having the same moral force.’15 Surely exactly the same 
objection applies when some claims against mild impairment are counted, and 
some are not. 
 
Anchor by Competition would even allow weaker claims to be considered 
relevant, whilst stronger ones are considered irrelevant. Imagine a condition, 
mild impairment+, which is more serious than mild impairment, but not 
relevant to death. In Case 4, if claims against mild impairment+ are added to 
Group B at Stage 2, their claims are irrelevant, whilst claims against mild 
impairment added to Group A are relevant. 
 
Aside from these theoretical issues, the biggest problem with Anchor by 
Competition is that it is vulnerable to, to my mind, devastating counter-
examples, once we look at diverse group cases. For example, consider this case: 
 
Case 5. 
                                                      
15 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 232. Scanlon’s application of this principle to the 
particular case has been criticized, but not the principle itself. See, for example, Michael 
Otsuka, ‘Scanlon and the Claims of the Many versus the One’ in Analysis 60 (2000): 288-293; 
and ‘Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals.’ 
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Stage 1: you can save Group A or Group B. Group A consists of one dying 
person. Group B consists of 10 people facing severe impairment. The 
Relevance View requires you to save Group B. 
 
Stage 2: one person facing mild impairment is added to Group A. One 
billion people facing mild impairment are added to Group B. 
 
Imagine that the decision to save Group B at Stage 1 was a very close one – the 
claims of the 10 facing severe impairment only just outweigh the claim of the 
dying person. Therefore, adding one relevant claim to Group A could tip the 
balance in favour of Group A. If that happens here, then at Stage 2 we should 
save Group A, because the lone claim added to Group A is relevant, whilst the 
one billion claims added to Group B are not. 
 
This implication of Anchor by Competition is counter-intuitive in two ways. 
First, the recommendation at Stage 2 that we should save one person from 
death and one person from mild impairment over ten people from severe 
impairment and one billion people from mild impairment is counter-intuitive 
by itself. Second, the comparison between the recommendations given at Stage 
1 and Stage 2 is also counter-intuitive. It is bizarre that at Stage 1 we ought to 
save Group B, and then by adding claims of the same strength to both groups, 
but with numbers heavily in favour of Group B, we ought to switch to Group A.  
 
It is important to note that this counter-intuitive implication cannot be 
deflected by appealing to respect, in the way that supporters of the Relevance 
View seek to deflect other potentially counter-intuitive cases involving the 
addition of claims, which appear to violate the Principle of Irrelevant 
Alternatives. In these cases, we start with two homogenous groups, and then 
add a third, separate, competing group. Adding a new group forces a switch of 
who we save, even though we don’t save the new group. This kind of case is a 
typical objection to the Relevance View: 
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Case 6. 
Stage 1: You can save Group B or Group C. Group B consists of 10 people 
facing severe impairment. Group C consists of 100 people facing mild 
impairment. 
 
Stage 2: Group A is added. This consists of one person facing death. 
 
According to the Relevance View, we ought to save Group C over Group B at 
Stage 1. But when we add Group A, we ought to save Group B (since Group C’s 
claims are no longer relevant). This is said to violate the Principle of Irrelevant 
Alternatives, since the addition of Group A causes us to switch, but not to A. 
 
Advocates of the Relevance View have responded to this by arguing that 
introducing Group A changes the choice situation in a morally relevant way. 
They argue that it would be disrespectful to allow the person in Group A to die 
in order to save Group C, but it is not disrespectful to that person to allow them 
to die in order to save Group B, since Group B hold claims relevant to their 
own. Voorhoeve states that ‘ARC rules that it would be disrespectful to the 
person whose life is at stake to spare a multitude [from mild impairment] 
rather than save his life. It would not be disrespectful to instead save many 
from [severe impairment].’16 Kamm also argues that respect explains why we 
should choose in this way. She says it would be disrespectful to attend to 
people facing paraplegia over someone who will die, but not disrespectful to 
attend to people facing quadriplegia.17 
 
However, this line cannot be run against our Case 5 counter-example. In that 
case, we were all set to allow the person in Group A to die in order to save the 
people facing severe impairment. This is not disrespectful. It is hard, therefore, 
to see why it would be disrespectful to allow them to die in order to save those 
exact same people plus some others. As for the additional person added to 
                                                      
16 Voorhoeve, ‘Why One should Count only Claims with which One Can Sympathize’. 
17 Kamm, Intricate Ethics, p. 298. 
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Group A (the person whose claim against mild impairment tips things in favour 
of Group A) it is hard to see how they could have any respect-based complaint: 
competing against them is a larger number of people with a stronger claim, and 
a far larger number of people with the same claim as they have. 
 
If we break this down into sub-groups, the claims of those facing severe 
impairment trump the dying person’s claim, and the claims of the one billion 
trump the claim of the lone person facing mild impairment. It seems to be 
some kind of moral alchemy, therefore, under which the claims of the dying 
person and the lone person facing mild impairment somehow combine to 
defeat the others, and there seems to be no respect-based rationale for allowing 
this alchemy to stand. 
 
IV Assessing Anchor by Strength 
Let’s now examine Anchor by Strength, according to which we find out whether 
a claim is relevant by comparing it to the strongest claim in the competition. 
Regardless of which anchoring rule proponents of the Relevance View 
originally had in mind, this variant of the Relevance View may seem attractive, 
as it would avoid the problems of Anchor by Competition: since all claims are 
compared with a single anchor (the strongest claim), claims of equal strength 
will either all be relevant, or all be irrelevant. Therefore, Equal Consideration 
for Equal Claims is respected.  
 
However, this view is also subject to devastating counter-examples. 
 
Case 7.  
Stage 1: You can save Group A or Group B. Group A consists of 100 
people facing mild impairment. Group B consists of 10 people facing 
severe impairment. 
 
Stage 2: One person facing death is added to Group A. 
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The Relevance View coupled with Anchor by Strength would give seriously 
counter-intuitive judgments in this case. Imagine a life boat crew faces a 
situation like Case 7. At Stage 1, they radio their ethics advisor. In accordance 
with Anchor by Strength, she tells them to save Group A – the 100 claims 
against mild impairment are relevant to, and outweigh, the ten against severe 
impairment. At Stage 2, they radio in with new information. There is an 
additional person in Group A and they are dying. The lifeboat crew now press 
on toward Group A with renewed vigour – not only are they going to save 100 
people from mild impairment, they are also going to save someone’s life. The 
ethics advisor radios back: ‘Turn the boat around.’ 
 
Why does the ethics advisor tell them to do this? She does so because now that 
there is someone facing death involved, the bar against which ‘relevant claims’ 
must be assessed shifts. According to Anchor by Strength, whilst the claims of 
the 100 in Group A were relevant to the strongest claims in play at Stage 1 
(those of the 10 in Group B), they are not relevant to the person dying in their 
midst at Stage 2, and so their claims no longer count. The new calculation pits 
the one dying person against the 10 facing severe impairment, and so the 
lifeboat must be turned around, as Group B’s aggregate relevant claims defeat 
the claim of the sole dying person. 
 
This is a counter-intuitive implication. Anchor by Strength says that we should 
save the 100 over the ten at Stage 1, but the ten over the 100 and the dying 
person at Stage 2.18 It is worth spelling out how this differs from counter-
examples that show that the Relevance View violates the Principle of Irrelevant 
Alternatives, such as Case 6. In those cases, adding a new group changes which 
of two groups we ought to save. In this case, however, it isn’t the addition of 
another group that forces us to change our minds; it is an addition to a group – 
                                                      
18 If the ethics advisor favours a version of the Relevance View under which we should hold 
weighted lotteries that only take into account relevant claims, the addition of the dying person 
should change the weighting of the lottery from being in Group A’s favour to being in Group B’s 
favour. I find this just as counter-intuitive. 
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the addition of a dying person to Group A means that we ought to turn away 
from Group A. The dying person isn’t an ‘alternative’ (irrelevant or not). 
Instead, they act as a moral repellent from Group A.  
 
Therefore, this counter-example shows that Anchor by Strength violates 
another principle that we intuitively endorse: 
 
Principle of Addition: merely adding a claim to a group of claims cannot 
lessen that group’s choice-worthiness, compared with a fixed alternative. 
 
For those of us who are at least attracted to the Relevance View it is quite 
plausible that adding a claim to a group of claims would not make it more 
choice-worthy – irrelevant claims are neutral. But the idea that adding a claim 
(indeed, a very weighty claim) to a group could lessen its choice-worthiness is 
seriously counter-intuitive. 
 
Perhaps some will be prepared to bite the bullet, and both deny the Principle of 
Addition and agree with Anchor by Strength’s recommendation in Case 7. After 
all, the intuition underlying both our rejection of the Case 7 recommendation 
and our affirmation of the Principle of Addition may be based on assuming that 
‘ought to be chosen over’ is transitive: Saving Group A with the dying person 
(call this A*) ought to be chosen over (or is better than) saving Group A. Saving 
A ought to be chosen over (or is better than) saving B. Therefore, saving A* 
ought to be chosen over (or is better than) saving B. But we already know that 
advocates of the Relevance View reject transitivity of whatever they take to be 
the relevant relation, be it normative or evaluative.19 Indeed, it was a case of 
                                                      
19 Or, at least, they reject transitivity for simple descriptions of the options (e.g., ‘Save A’). It is 
possible to preserve transitivity if we allow options to be described in moralized terms. See n. 11 
above; and Voorhoeve,  ‘How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims’, pp. 78-79. Voorhoeve’s 
response draws on John Broome, Weighing Goods (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), ch. 5. 
 
 17 
 
‘mere addition’ that led Larry Temkin toward rejecting transitivity for ‘all-
things-considered-better-than’ in the first place.20 
 
However, while the Principle of Addition appears to draw support from 
transitivity, rejecting the transitivity of ‘ought to be chosen over’ or ‘all-things-
considered-better-than’ does not entail rejecting the Principle of Addition. It is 
consistent with denying that A ought to be chosen over B and B ought to be 
chosen over C always leads to the conclusion that A ought to be chosen over C, 
that it sometimes or even often does. And while I constructed a defence of the 
Principle of Addition based on transitivity above, the Principle does not 
explicitly rely on it. The Principle of Addition is a very restricted claim. It only 
applies to cases in which everything is left exactly the same, but one further 
claim (from an already existing person21) is added to one of the groups. 
 
So, even if we reject transitivity, the Principle of Addition at the least represents 
a further bullet, and a pretty significant one, that must be bitten in order to 
affirm Anchor by Strength. Furthermore, even if we reject the Principle of 
Addition, Case 7 puts independent pressure on the Relevance View: whatever 
principles we hold in the background, the advice in Case 7 is implausible. 
 
The respect-based response to Irrelevant Alternative cases will, again, not help 
us here. It may well be disrespectful to save those facing mild impairment over 
the dying person in Case 6. But the same does not ring true with our case here. 
Here the presence of the dying person causes us to turn away from a group 
which contains them, when the alternative is to save them alongside those 
facing mild impairment. It is hard to portray this as a form of respect. Indeed, it 
seems to suggest that the dying person’s life has negative moral value. 
                                                      
20 Larry S. Temkin, ‘Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox’ in Philosophy & Public Affairs 
16 (1987): 138-187; and Rethinking the Good, pp. vii-ix. 
21 Some of the key cases in which transitity seems to fail are cases in which additional people 
(and not just additional claims) are added. See Temkin, ‘Intransitivity and the Mere Addition 
Paradox’; Derek Parfit, ‘Future Generations: Further Problems’ in Philosophy & Public Affairs 11 
(1982): 113-172, at pp. 158-169. 
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V Alternative anchoring principles 
Anchor by Competition and Anchor by Strength are the two most plausible 
interpretations of the anchoring rule in the literature on the Relevance View 
(and in particular of Voorhoeve’s principle 4 – his key statement of the 
anchoring rule). Both Anchor by Competition and Anchor by Strength produce 
highly counter-intuitive results and violate key plausible principles in diverse 
group cases. Perhaps some other anchoring rule can do a better job? Although 
not attributable to any of the proponents of Limited Aggregation in the 
literature, the following rule might be preferable22: 
 
Anchor by Competition (Transfer): in order to be relevant, a C-type claim 
must be sufficiently strong relative to the strongest claim with which 
any C-token completes. 
 
In other words, in order for a claim against mild impairment to be relevant, it 
must be sufficiently strong relative to the strongest claim with which any claim 
against mild impairment competes. If any claim against mild impairment is 
irrelevant, then this irrelevance transfers across groups. Notice how this 
anchoring rule would avoid the counter-intuitive implications of Anchor by 
Competition and Anchor by Strength, exposed in Cases 5 and 7 respectively. In 
Case 5, since the claims of the one billion facing mild impairment are not 
relevant to death, then the claim of the one person facing mild impairment is 
also not relevant. Therefore, adding the additional claims at Stage 2 would not 
force us to switch groups, and we would not violate the principle of Equal 
Consideration for Equal Claims. In Case 7, adding the dying person to Group A 
would not render the claims of those facing mild impairment in Group A 
irrelevant. Therefore, we would not switch to Group B at Stage 2, and therefore 
would not violate the Principle of Addition. 
 
                                                      
22 I am grateful to an editor of Philosophy & Public Affairs for suggesting this anchoring rule to 
me. 
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However, Anchor by Competition (Transfer) faces other problems. One is that 
it only transfers irrelevance to claims of equal strength. This means that, as 
with Anchor by Competition, claims might be considered irrelevant even 
though weaker claims are considered relevant. There are fixes for this problem. 
But Anchor by Competition (Transfer) also violates the Principle of Addition. 
Consider this case: 
 
Case 8. 
Stage 1: You can save Group A or Group B. Group A consists of 10 people 
facing severe impairment, and one person facing mild impairment. 
Group B consists of 101 people facing mild impairment. All claims are 
relevant, and the Relevance View directs you to save Group B (101 people 
facing mild impairment). 
 
Stage 2: one person facing death is added to Group B. 
 
At Stage 2, claims against mild impairment are no longer relevant according to 
Anchor by Competition (Transfer). Since the single claim against mild 
impairment in Group A is now competing with a claim against death, it is not 
relevant, and so – due to the transfer of irrelevance – no claim against mild 
impairment is relevant. This means that the solo claim against death is now 
competing with the ten claims against severe impairment, which outweigh the 
claim against death. Therefore, the Relevance View tells us, at Stage 2, to switch 
from saving Group B to Group A: the effect of adding the claim against death to 
Group B is that we switch away from Group B. This is the same counter-
intuitive implication as in Case 7. 
 
These two problems with Anchor by Competition (Transfer) stem from two key 
restrictions. First, relevance is heavily restricted: C-claims are only relevant 
when they are sufficiently strong in comparison to the strongest claim with 
which any C-claim competes. Irrelevance is transferred. This is why all claims 
against mild impairment are suddenly ruled out in Case 8, Stage 2. Second, 
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transfer of irrelevance is restricted to claims of exactly the same strength, which 
is why, for example, claims against mild impairment+ might be considered 
irrelevant, even though weaker claims against mild impairment are considered 
relevant. 
 
Both these issues can be addressed by this anchoring principle, which builds on 
the idea of ‘transferring’, but transfers relevance instead of irrelevance: 
 
Anchor by Competition (Transfer 2): in order to be relevant a claim must 
be either: (a) sufficiently strong relative to the strongest claim with 
which it competes (i.e., pass the Anchor by Competition test); or (b) at 
least as strong as another relevant claim. 
 
The effect of Anchor by Competition (Transfer 2) is basically to take the 
weakest claim that would pass the Anchor by Competition test, and then make 
all claims that are as strong as, or stronger than, that claim relevant. This 
anchoring rule would avoid the counter-intuitive implications of Anchor by 
Competition (Transfer). First, since it transfers relevance to all claims as strong 
or stronger, it will never allow a situation in which a weaker claim is relevant 
whilst a stronger claim is irrelevant. Second, in Case 8, Stage 2, since the claims 
against mild impairment in Group B continue to be relevant to the claims 
against severe impairment in Group A, all claims against mild impairment 
continue to be relevant. Therefore, adding a dying person to Group B in Case 8 
does not force us to switch to saving Group A, and therefore Anchor by 
Competition (Transfer 2) does not violate the Principle of Addition in that case. 
In addition, like Anchor by Competition (Transfer), this principle would not fall 
foul of Cases 5 or 7. 
 
However, Anchor by Competition (Transfer 2) does violate the Principle of 
Addition in other diverse group cases. For example, this case: 
 
Case 9. 
 21 
 
Stage 1: You can save Group A or Group B. Group A consists of one 
person facing death. Group B consists of a large number of people, N9, 
facing mild impairment. Since the claims of Group B are not relevant to 
claims against death, you should save Group A. 
 
Stage 2: A single person facing mild impairment is added to Group A. 
 
At Stage 2, the claims of Group B suddenly become relevant. Group B’s claims 
become relevant because the claim against mild impairment that is added to 
Group A is relevant, since it is sufficiently strong in comparison with the 
strongest claims with which it competes, namely the equally strong claims in 
Group B. Because this one claim against mild impairment is relevant, relevance 
is transferred to all such claims. If N9 is large enough, then at Stage 2, the 
claims of Group B will outweigh the two claims in Group A, with the result that 
at Stage 2 we should switch to saving Group B, even though all that changes is 
that a single claim is added to Group A. The Principle of Addition is therefore 
violated.  
 
This may seem less alarming than previous violations of the Principle of 
Addition – after all, the claim that is added, but treated as if it has negative 
weight, is a claim that, in the context of a choice involving a claim against 
death, is not that important. But that the added claim is a relatively weak one is 
itself important, when we look at things from the perspective of the person 
facing death who is not saved. First, a person who is dying is not saved in order 
to save many people facing mild impairment. Therefore, not only does Anchor 
by Competition (Transfer 2) violate the Principle of Addition, it violates the 
core intuitions behind the Relevance View. Second, the reason this person is 
allowed to die whilst claims irrelevant to their own are satisfied is because they 
happen to find themselves in need alongside a person whose claim is also 
irrelevant to their own. 
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We could continue to search for an anchoring principle which will avoid 
violating both Equal Consideration for Equal Claims and the Principle of 
Addition. I fear this is impossible. Any principle (such as Anchor by 
Competition) which only allows anchoring claims to affect the relevance of 
claims in other groups will allow for a plurality of anchors, and therefore violate 
Equal Consideration for Equal Claims. But any principle which corrects for this 
by insisting that there is only one anchor for all claims will violate the Principle 
of Addition. 
 
VI Healthcare cases are not cases of competing claims 
In addition to the theoretical issues identified above, the Relevance View has 
less practical relevance than its proponents presume. In this section and the 
following one, I will show that the Relevance View doesn’t apply to many cases 
of healthcare resource allocation, and that it is difficult to see how its core 
claims can be modified such that it does apply to such cases. 
 
The key cases used to discuss the Relevance View are cases of competition – we 
can either save this person or group, or some other group. Alex Voorhoeve 
explicitly limits his version of the Relevance View (Aggregate Relevant Claims) 
to cases of competing claims. Competing claims, recall, are defined like this:  
 
2. Individuals’ claims compete just in case they cannot be jointly 
satisfied. 
 
Therefore, ARC applies only when there are individual claims that cannot be 
jointly satisfied. Proponents of the Relevance View present decisions relating to 
healthcare resources as (complex) cases of competing claims: various groups of 
claims compete for scarce resources, so we can save some people from death, or 
others from paralysis, or some other group from chronic pain, and so on. My 
central claim in this section is that many decisions regarding the allocation of 
healthcare resources are not cases of competing claims in Voorhoeve’s sense. 
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Some healthcare decisions might be cases of competing claims – for example 
when we can only fund research into treatments for condition x or condition y. 
But decisions about which treatments (once available) to provide will rarely, if 
ever, look like this.23 Consider this case: 
 
Case 10. A hospital trust has $1m at its disposal. Two people require life-
saving operations, costing $500,000 each. 1 billion people require a 
headache pill, costing $0.001 each. 
 
It is tempting to put these two sets of claims into groups, and to say that either 
we save the dying or we save the people with headaches (both of these courses 
of action use up the full $1m budget). These, after all, look like the plausible 
alternatives: either the claims of the dying outweigh the claims of the headache 
sufferers, or they don’t, or we refuse to contemplate aggregation in this case. 
Each of these three alternatives recommends saving all the people with 
headaches or all the people who are dying. And this is how the literature tends 
to discuss such cases.24 But separating them out into two groups, one of which 
is to be saved, makes this seem like a case of competing claims when in fact it is 
not. There are no two individual claims in this case that cannot be jointly 
satisfied. We can jointly satisfy both claims against death, or any two claims 
against headaches, or any claim against death alongside any claim against a 
headache. And this is true of healthcare resource allocation more generally: of 
all the claims we might meet, there will usually be various (perhaps morally 
implausible) possible distributions which will allow us to satisfy any two of the 
individual claims. In other words, healthcare resource decisions are not cases of 
people with condition x competing with people with condition y. Rather, there 
is one large group of people with a diverse range of claims. Various subsets of 
                                                      
23 Kamm advocates slightly different positions (both of which employ the notion of relevant 
claims) for individual medical decisions and decisions about which treatments to fund. See her 
discussion of Sob3 and Sob4 in Morality, Mortality Volume 1, ch. 10. 
24 See, for example, the exchange between Voorhoeve and Kamm in Journal of Medical Ethics 41 
(2015): 492-495; Temkin’s discussion of WHO decisions in Rethinking the Good, pp. 79-80; 
Voorhoeve, ‘Healthy Nails versus Long Lives’; Voorhoeve, ‘Balancing Small against Large 
Burdens’. 
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this large group can be saved. Each person is both in competition with every 
other person, and potentially can be saved alongside every other person. Call 
this ‘quasi-competition’. 
 
VII Applying the Relevance View to quasi-competition cases 
Strictly speaking, therefore, Voorhoeve’s ARC, as it stands, has nothing to say 
about Case 10, and any healthcare decision like it.25 And, as I will show in this 
section, it is unclear how we should apply the Relevance View more generally, 
an argument developed with cases of competing claims (such as Cases 1 and 2) 
in mind, to cases in which claims quasi-compete. We can try to amend or 
clarify the Relevance View so that it does apply to healthcare cases involving 
quasi-competition. In this section I consider some possible amendments. But 
these amendments are problematic – some entail counter-intuitive results, and 
others raise a series of difficulties with interpreting the requirements of respect 
in quasi-competition cases. Since advocates of the Relevance View have focused 
on competition cases, in which these issues do not arise, they have not 
addressed these difficulties. 
 
The simplest way to amend or clarify the Relevance View so that it applies to 
quasi-competition cases would be as follows: 
 
Relevance View (quasi-competition): 
1. Individuals’ claims quasi-compete when they are both members of a set 
of claims which cannot all be satisfied. 
                                                      
25 There are further important differences between healthcare systems and individual 
treatments. Healthcare decisions are iterative. This is relevant because whilst any individual 
minor ailment may not be relevant to death, a lifetime of untreated minor ailments may be 
(Temkin, Rethinking the Good, pp. 79-80; Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 236-238). 
In such cases, it seems better to apply to Relevance View to the policy or sequence of decisions, 
rather than each individual decision (this would also counter problems identified in Johan E. 
Gustafsson, ‘Sequential Dominance and the Anti-Aggregation Principle’ in Philosophical Studies 
172 (2015): 1593-1601.) Furthermore, national healthcare systems paid for by taxation are often 
seen not as benevolent distributors, but as social insurance schemes, and if it is rational to 
insure against minor ailments, then on that model they should be covered (Voorhoeve, ‘Why 
One should Count only Claims with which One Can Sympathize’ and ‘Healthy Nails versus 
Long Lives’). 
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In cases of quasi-competition: 
2. A claim is relevant if it is strong enough in comparison with the 
strongest claim under consideration. 
3. You should choose an alternative that satisfies the greatest sum of 
strength-weighted, relevant claims. 
 
So far as I can see, this is what Relevance View advocates have in mind when 
they apply their view to healthcare systems. For example, this is roughly how a 
proposed Dutch system works, which Voorhoeve considers to be an 
instantiation of ARC.26 To test this view, consider:  
 
Case 11. A hospital trust has $1m at its disposal. There are three groups of 
patients in need. Group A is a dying person who can be saved at minimal 
cost. Group B is a group of people facing severe impairment who are 
extremely expensive to save. Group C is a very large group of people 
facing mild impairment who can each be saved at minimal cost.  
 
In this case, the Relevance View (quasi-competition) would have us do the 
following. First, eliminate from consideration Group C, as their claims are 
irrelevant to the strongest claim. Second, satisfy the greatest sum of strength-
weighted claims from those in Groups A and B. We will save Group A (the 
dying person), and then as many of Group B as we can. But this is an odd thing 
to do. Group A is being saved, so we don’t need to worry about disrespecting 
them through failing to save them in order to satisfy claims irrelevant to their 
own. And Group C’s very cheap claims are relevant to, and much more efficient 
to meet than, Group B’s. In a competition between Groups B and C, we would 
save Group C. So even if we accept the respect-based rationale for the 
Relevance View, it gives us no reason to save Group B here. Under the 
Relevance View (quasi-competition) we seem to be saving Group B and not 
Group C as a form of respect to Group A even when Group A is to be saved. 
                                                      
26 Voorhoeve, ‘Healthy Nails versus Long Lives’. 
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There is another way to amend the Relevance View so that it can be applied to 
cases of quasi-competition. Call this the Relevance View (sub-competitions). 
This would involve seeing the overall quasi-competition as divided into a series 
of sub-competitions over the money. 
 Relevance View (sub-competitions): 
 In cases of quasi-competition: 
1. Sub-Competition 1: Establish whether to meet the costs of satisfying 
the strongest claim, or to use that money to satisfy weaker relevant 
claims. 
2. If the strongest claim is not to be satisfied, set it aside. 
3. Sub-Competition 2: Establish whether to meet the costs of satisfying 
the strongest remaining claim (i.e., claims that have not been met or 
set aside), or to use that money to satisfy weaker relevant claims. 
4. If the strongest remaining claim is not to be satisfied, set it aside. 
5. Repeat 3 and 4 until resources run out. 
 
In Case 11, we would first see whether it was worth spending the small amount 
on Group A or on the (expensive but relevant) Group B claims. We would 
decide in favour of Group A. With that sub-competition settled, we would then 
see whether Group B or C should be saved with the remaining funds, with 
Group B as the anchoring claim for this second sub-competition. We would 
decide in favour of Group C. This gets the right result in Case 11, as it doesn’t 
continue to try to respect Group A even after it’s been determined that they will 
be saved. 
 
But the Relevance View (sub-competitions) may over-respect the dying in 
another way. Consider this case: 
 
Case 12. A hospital trust has $1m at its disposal. There are three groups of 
patients in need: Group A is one person who needs a life-saving 
treatment which costs $500,000; Group B is 40 people who face severe 
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impairment – their treatment costs $25,000 each; and Group C is 10,000 
people who face mild impairment – their treatment costs $100 each. 
 
Here is how the Relevance View (sub-competitions) would handle Case 12. The 
strongest claim is the claim against death. The first sub-competition is 
therefore a competition over whether we should spend $500,000 on saving that 
person, or half of Group B (since Group C’s claims are irrelevant to death). We 
would save half of Group B. With that sub-competition settled, we now must 
decide how to spend the remaining $500,000. Of the remaining ‘live’ claims, the 
remaining half of Group B’s claims are the strongest. So, we take each member 
of Group B in turn, and decide whether to spend $25,000 saving them, or 250 
members of Group C. Group C’s claims are relevant to these claims, and 250 of 
Group C’s claims outweigh one of Group B’s, and so the members of Group C 
would win each of these sub-competitions, and we would end up saving half of 
Group C. 
 
Here is a potential problem with this view. In the first sub-competition, the 
Relevance View (sub-competitions) instructs us to save 20 people facing severe 
impairment over the dying person, in order to ensure that the dying person is 
not disrespected. But recall that ten claims against severe impairment outweigh 
death – ten would be enough to ensure respect. It is therefore arguable that we 
also wouldn’t have disrespected the dying person in Case 12 by saving only ten 
people from severe impairment (at a cost of $250,000) and using the remaining 
money elsewhere. Once ten people have been saved from severe impairment, 
we have ensured respect to the dying person, and so to save more than ten 
potentially over-respects the dying. This is especially problematic when, as in 
Case 12, the additional ten are an inefficient use of the remaining resources 
(since some claims relevant to their claims, and with greater aggregate weight, 
could be met, namely those held by Group C). 
 
If this is indeed a problem, we can alter the Relevance View (sub-competitions) 
so that if we decide not to satisfy a stronger claim, we only satisfy enough 
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weaker, relevant claims so as to meet the minimum threshold for respect, 
allocating the rest of the money for further sub-competitions. But this is also 
potentially problematic: now we are using money that we might have used to 
save the dying person to satisfy claims irrelevant to hers. We save some people 
from mild impairment instead of saving her. Perhaps this is the kind of 
disrespectful action we must avoid. 
 
These two variants of the Relevance View (sub-competitions) raise questions 
about how to understand the requirements of respect in quasi-competition 
cases.27 I do not have the space to try to resolve these issues here. What I want 
to make clear is that these are difficulties with applying the Relevance View to 
quasi-competition cases, and therefore healthcare allocation, with which its 
proponents have not dealt, since they have assumed that the Relevance View 
unproblematically extends to healthcare allocation. Those who wish to apply 
the Relevance View to healthcare cases therefore must address these issues. 
 
There are two main questions posed by Case 12. First, when we have decided 
not to meet a stronger claim (such as death), does respect require that enough 
relevant claims are satisfied, or that only relevant claims are met using the 
resources that might have been spent on the strongest claim? The two variants 
of the Relevance View (sub-competitions) come apart on this issue. It is unclear 
to me which is a better understanding of respect in these circumstances.28 
Second, must respect be shown by the sub-competition of which the strongest 
claim is part, or by each sub-competition? If the former, we can ensure respect 
to the unmet strongest claim (whether this is done by meeting enough relevant 
claims, or only relevant claims) at the first sub-competition, and then move on, 
                                                      
27 I am grateful to two editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs and an audience in York (and 
Martin O’Neill in particular) for useful comments and discussion here. 
28 In discussing this work with others, I have found them to have divergent intuitions on this, 
and related, questions. Relatedly, the literature is unclear on what counts as disrespect in 
competition cases. For example, Kamm is inconsistent on whether (dis)respect is shown by 
whom you save, or whose claims you even consider – within one paragraph she suggests that it 
would disrespectful to ‘attend to’, ‘save’, and ‘consider’ the wrong people. Intricate Ethics, p. 
298. 
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putting the strongest claim aside, safe in the knowledge that respect has been 
achieved. If the latter, however, both variants of the Relevance View (sub-
competitions) will disrespect the unmet strongest claim at the next sub-
competition, since at that point we will be considering, and potentially 
meeting, claims irrelevant to the strongest claim. 
 
These difficulties about how to understand the requirements of respect in 
quasi-competition cases show that we cannot read directly across from 
competition cases to quasi-competition cases. In the standard cases of 
competition among homogenous groups, these questions simply don’t arise. In 
such cases, like Case 6, you either save the people facing severe impairment, or 
you don’t: there is no question of whether saving some but not all (and saving 
some from mild impairment as well) would show sufficient respect. And there 
is no question as to whether respect must be shown through one stage of the 
process, or at each stage in a decision-making process. Applying the Relevance 
View to quasi-competition cases is not a simple matter, and so those wishing to 
apply the view to healthcare cases must show how this is to be done. 
 
VIII Concluding remarks 
Advocates of the Relevance View think that it is a position that works well for 
cases involving competing claims, and present healthcare decisions as these 
kinds of cases. I have shown here that healthcare decisions are not, in general, 
cases of competing claims, they are cases of quasi-competition, and that it is 
not obvious how to apply the Relevance View to cases of quasi-competition. I 
have also shown that in cases of diverse competing groups, the Relevance View 
is shown to have a hitherto unacknowledged ambiguity, and to lead to seriously 
counter-intuitive implications. 
 
Where does this leave us? First, the distinction between cases of competing 
claims and cases of quasi-competing claims is an important one. Too often the 
literature suggests that we must save the people with condition x or the people 
with condition y. But in quasi-competition cases we can save some of the 
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people with condition x and some of the people with condition y. At the least, 
proponents of the Relevance View must explain how their view handles such 
cases, since, as I have shown, it is not obvious how it would or should do so. It 
is, however, questionable whether we should seek to apply the Relevance View 
beyond competition cases, given the flaws I exposed with the view as applied to 
competition cases in sections II-V. 
  
Second, the anchoring problem is one that proponents of the Relevance View 
must address: if they wish to defend the view, they must defend a particular 
anchoring rule. In doing so, however, they must be prepared to bite bullets and 
jettison one of the normatively compelling principles I have outlined. 
 
Third, by showing these powerful counter-examples to the Relevance View, and 
in showing what principles we would need to reject in order to endorse the 
counter-intuitive implications, I have put further pressure on, and presented 
new bullets to bite, for advocates of the Relevance View. This doesn’t show us 
that we must reject the Relevance View – after all, both Pure Aggregation and 
Anti-Aggregation are hard to swallow (recall Cases 1 and 2). Each position has 
counter-intuitive implications, and individuals will decide differently on which 
implications they are and are not prepared to accept. But my cases, and the 
principles they show the Relevance View to violate, are very significant bullets. 
I was prepared to accept the Relevance View until I developed the arguments 
presented in sections II-V. I can no longer do so. While I find some of the 
implications of the other views counter-intuitive, they at least make internal 
sense. The counter-examples I present here are not only counter-intuitive in 
terms of what they recommend, the various comparisons between Stage 1 and 
Stage 2 in my cases also show a bizarre internal logic to the Relevance View 
that it is very hard to accept. Adding or subtracting claims t0 and from groups 
does not have such odd and normatively disturbing effects in either Pure 
Aggregation or Anti-Aggregation: neither violates Equal Consideration for 
Equal Claims, or the Principle of Addition. I have been impressed by the replies 
that advocates of the Relevance View have been able to make to criticisms from 
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the Principle of Irrelevant Alternatives and transitivity, but I cannot imagine 
rejecting either Equal Consideration for Equal Claims, or the Principle of 
Addition, or accepting the recommendations of the view in the cases presented 
here. At the least, these are concerns with the view that must be addressed. 
 
If, with me, you reject the Relevance View, we are left with the following three 
options. First, we could accept Anti-Aggregation. I find this the least plausible 
of our options. Imagine N1 in Case 1 were one billion people. It is implausible 
that we should allow so many people to suffer such a serious harm in order to 
save one life. Second, we could accept some form of Pure Aggregation (this 
could involve giving some additional weight to the worse off in a prioritarian or 
egalitarian manner, rather than simply maximizing the satisfaction of claims). 
However, no matter how far we stack the deck in favour of those with more 
serious claims, this position does force us to acknowledge that if N2 gets large 
enough in Case 2, we ought to prevent the mild headaches. This is a sizeable 
bullet to bite.29 
 
The final option is to try to find an alternative version of Limited Aggregation, 
or at least a position that explains our judgments in Cases 1 and 2, without 
running into the problems of Anti-Aggregation, Pure Aggregation, or the 
Relevance View. One version of this option would be to articulate a plurality of 
values, which must be traded off against one another in hard cases. Another 
would be to continue to use the notion of the ‘relevance’ of claims, but not to 
use it to establish whether claims are relevant or irrelevant to the decision 
simpliciter. Instead, we could ask whether a claim is relevant to a series of sub-
competitions or questions. For example, we could ask whether the strongest 
claim is ‘matched’ by enough claims relevant to it. If not, we meet the strongest 
claim. If it is matched, we look at the next strongest claim, and see if that is 
                                                      
29 For an attempt to show that it is not as significant a bullet as we might be tempted to think, 
see Alistair Norcross, ‘Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives’ in Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 26 (1997): 135-167. 
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matched by enough claims relevant to it, and so on.30 As things stand, I think 
we are forced to choose between Pure Aggregation, or finding another version 
of Limited Aggregation. 
                                                      
30 Variants of this view were suggested to me independently by an editor of Philosophy & Public 
Affairs and Victor Tadros. Tadros’ version, which takes the arguments of the present paper as 
its starting point, is outlined in his ‘Restricted Aggregation: the Local Relevance View’ 
(unpublished m/s). The view, though about competition cases, has much in common with the 
second variant of the Relevance View (sub-competitions), outlined in Section VII. As well as the 
concerns about the demands of respect expressed there, I have additional concerns with this 
view, but I certainly think it is worthy of exploration. One concern is that there may be a 
plurality of ways to ‘match up’ relevant claims, which would deliver different verdicts. My chief 
concern is that the view allows that whether or not we should save a life (or indeed hundreds of 
thousands of lives) could turn on whether or not one individual has a mild headache. Because 
the headache is ruled as irrelevant to whether the deaths are ‘matched’, but not ruled out as 
irrelevant to the larger question of which group we should save, it could end up being the 
determining factor. This goes against many Limited Aggregation intuitions – when people are 
dying, these tiny claims just don’t matter. See, for example, Kamm on tie-breaks in Morality, 
Mortality Volume 1, ch. 8. 
